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Abstract—We use data from a sample of child care centers to estimate the
relationships between cost and child care quality, and between revenue
and quality. We use a measure of child care quality, designed by devel-
opmental psychologists, that is positively associated with child develop-
ment. Taking the estimated cost-quality and revenue-quality relationships
as given, we estimate the objective functions of firms and compute the
quality supply function. The results indicate that the supply of quality is
moderately elastic with respect to price and the wages of child care center
workers. Implications of the results for child care policy are discussed.
I. Introduction
DEVELOPMENTAL psychologists assert that the cog-nitive, social, and emotional development of children
is enhanced by exposure to high-quality child care and is
harmed by exposure to low-quality care (Hayes, Palmer, &
Zaslow, 1990). The quality of child care services in the
United States is thought to be mediocre on average, partic-
ularly in comparison to the quality of care provided in other
developed countries (Whitebook, Howes, & Phillips, 1990;
Mocan, 1997; Bergmann, 1996). There is considerable in-
terest among policymakers in finding ways to increase the
quality of child care in the United States. For example, the
Federal Child Care Development Block Grant stipulated
that a portion of funds appropriated under the grant be set
aside for “quality-improving” activities. However, using
government policy to accomplish this goal will be difficult
without understanding the behavior of firms supplying day
care services, the “technology” of day care, and the result-
ing relationships among quality, cost, and the price of care.1
Until recently, little was known about these important issues
in the child care market. Mocan (1995, 1997) provided the
fist analysis of the cost-quality relationship for day care
centers with results that are useful for public policy, includ-
ing an estimate of the cost of increasing quality. We build on
Mocan’s analysis by estimating the supply function for
quality. Our results provide a basis for analyzing the impact
of alternative forms of government subsidies that are in-
tended to improve child care quality.
An important issue in conducting such an analysis is the
appropriate definition of child care quality. Several previous
analyses of the cost-quality relationship in day care centers
included variables such as the child-staff ratio, group size,
and the average education of the staff as proxies for quality
in the cost function (Preston, 1993; Mukerjee & Witte,
1993; Powell & Cosgrove, 1992). However, these variables
are more appropriately thought of as inputs to the produc-
tion of quality, and as such do not belong in the cost
function.2 In other contexts, the quality of child care pur-
chased by a family has been treated as exogenous (Ribar,
1995), as equivalent to the family’s expenditure on child
care (Michalopoulos, Robins, & Garfinkel, 1992), as an
unobserved variable proxied by the mode of care, such as
day care center, family day care home, and so on (Leibo-
witz, Waite, & Witsberger, 1988), or as an unobserved
choice variable (Blau & Robins, 1988; Connelly, 1992). In
this paper, we take a different approach. Developmental
psychologists define the quality of child care by the devel-
opmental appropriateness of the interactions between the pro-
vider and the child, and the environment, curriculum, materi-
als, and activities to which children are exposed. Psychologists
have designed instruments to measure the quality of child care
defined in this way. For example, teaching staff can be rated by
observers on aspects of care such as how sensitive they are to
children, whether they encourage children to engage in activ-
ities, and whether they use positive guidance techniques. As
measured by these instruments, child care quality has a positive
effect on child development. This is not surprising because
child care quality is defined by provider behavior and environ-
ments that have been determined through research and practice
to foster child development (Love, Schochet, & Meckstroth,
1996).
We believe that the concept of child care quality developed
by psychologists is the appropriate one for our purposes.
Arguments for government intervention in the child care mar-
ket are often based on the externalities generated by exposing
children to high-quality care (Council of Economic Advisors,
1997; Robins, 1991; Hayes et al., 1990). Other common
arguments for intervention in the child care market are that
parents are unaware of the benefits of high-quality care or lack
the ability to discern the quality of care (Walker, 1991). It
makes sense, therefore, to use a measure of quality that is
known to be correlated with child development when analyz-
ing the supply of quality in child care.
We use a measure of child care quality that is derived from
an instrument designed by developmental psychologists. This
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1 Day care centers accounted for 30% of all primary child care arrange-
ments for preschool children of employed mothers in 1993 (Casper, 1997).
In-home babysitters and family day care providers constituted 21% of
arrangements, but there is much less information available about such
providers. Relatives, including the father and the mother (while working),
accounted for the remaining child care for preschool children of employed
mothers.
2 Another problem with treating these variables as proxies for quality is
that they do not appear to be closely related to either the quality of care
or child development (Blau, 1997, 1999, 2000). This is similar to the
common finding in the literature on schools that observable resources have
little measurable impact on student outcomes (Hanushek, 1994). See
Gertler and Waldman (1992) for an analysis of the cost function for
nursing homes that treats quality as an unobserved choice variable of the
firm.
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instrument was used to rate the quality of care in a stratified
random sample of four hundred day care centers in four states.
Detailed data on costs, inputs, prices, and other key variables
were collected for the same centers, and we use these data to
estimate the cost function and the market price-quality locus
facing day care centers. These two functions are the constraints
faced by day care centers in their efforts to achieve their
objectives. Taking these estimated constraints as given, we
then estimate the objective functions of the firms in our sample.
We assume that firms care about profit and quality, and we
estimate the relative weights attached to these two variables,
using variation across firms in the constraint functions they
face to identify these weights. This variation arises from
variation in geographical location of the firms, both across and
within states. We allow for-profit and nonprofit firms to have
different relative weights on profit and quality, and we specify
and estimate additional constraints on the profit that can be
earned by nonprofit centers as a result of their nonprofit legal
status. We use the estimated constraint and objective functions
to simulate the supply of quality and the response of firms to
subsidies intended to increase the quality of child care. The
main empirical finding is that the supply of quality is moder-
ately responsive to price and wages.
In the following sections of the paper, we specify a model
of day care center behavior, describe our econometric meth-
ods, discuss the data, and present the results. The final
section concludes with a discussion of the implications of
the findings.
II. A Model of Day Care Center Behavior
The basic premise of the analysis is that the market for
center-based child care is in competitive equilibrium. Com-
petition results in an equilibrium price-quality locus that
individual day care providers and consumers take as given.
Quality here is defined as the developmental appropriate-
ness of the care provided and is assumed to be observable
by consumers. By choosing the quality of care to offer, firms
determine the price they can charge, and, by choosing the
center from which to purchase care, consumers determine
the price of care they will pay and the quality of care they
receive. Consumers might care about many aspects of child
care other than quality, but we focus on quality because of
its importance for child development. Evidence (presented
later) shows that quality and price are positively related, but
that most other easily observed attributes of child care are
not associated with price. Child care markets are location
specific, and variation across locations in the position and
shape of the equilibrium price-quality locus provides the
information needed to identify the quality supply behavior
of firms. This variation arises from differences in market
conditions across locations. In the following subsections,
we fill in the details of this framework.
A. Technology and Cost
Both for-profit and nonprofit firms are assumed to be cost
minimizers. The firm chooses the weekly number of hours
of each type of staff (differentiated by skill) and the number
of groups to which children will be assigned to minimize
cost subject to the quality production function and given
values of quality and wages by skill level. We treat the
quantity of output and the characteristics of the families and
children served by a center as determined by choices made
by consumers, given the price and quality set by the firm.3
We do not explicitly model nonpersonnel inputs because we
have little information on input prices other than staff
compensation. The cost function for center j has the form
Cj  CWj1, . . . , WjT, Hj, Qj, Zj, Mj, Gj, j, (1)
where C is cost,
Wji is the wage rate for the ith type of staff,
there are T different types of staff,
H is the quantity of care (child hours),
Q is quality,
Z is a set of fixed center characteristics,
M is a set of parent and child characteristics,
G is the number of groups (classrooms), and
 is a disturbance.
G belongs in the cost function because it determines how
many staff hours are required to provide care for the
quantity of child care services (H) demanded of the firm.4
B. Price Determination
Following the literature on demand for differentiated
products (Rosen, 1974) and its application to child care
(Blau & Hagy, 1998; Hagy, 1998; Walker, 1992), we assume
that there exists an equilibrium price-quality locus in firm
j’s market:
Pj  PQj, Xm j, (2)
where Xm( j) represents factors that shift the locus, such as the
size and characteristics of the market, m( j), in which firm j is
3 In the empirical analysis, we allow for the possibility that wages and
the quantity and quality of care are endogenous as a result of unobserved
heterogeneity. Another set of constraints that a firm might face in mini-
mizing cost is state regulations governing the maximum allowable group
size, the minimum allowable staff-child ratio, and the qualifications of the
staff. It is straightforward to incorporate such regulations in the model, but
we do not do so here because regulations do not appear to be binding
constraints on most of the firms in our sample. We discuss this later.
4 The cost minimization problem underlying equation (1) is to choose
Nj1  NjT and Gj to
Min   
i1
T
NjiWjiGj  jQj  QNj1, . . . , NjT, Hj, gj, Zj, Mj,
where Nji is the number of hours of labor of staff type i used per room,
g 	 H/G is group size measured in child hours, and Q is the quality
production function.
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located. Firms and consumers are assumed to take the price-
quality locus as given: it is determined by market supply and
demand, not by the actions of any individual firm or consumer.
C. Quality Supply
We follow Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) and assume
that firms care about both profit and quality, with an objective
function of the form U(Qj, 
(Qj)), where 
 represents the
firm’s profit.5 If UQ  0, the firm is said to have “profit-
deviating” preferences. A center with for-profit legal status
could have profit-deviating preferences or could be a profit-
maximizer (UQ  0). The same is true for a center with
nonprofit status: nonprofit firms may care about quality be-
cause many such firms were started for the purpose of provid-
ing high-quality child care services in order to correct a
perceived market failure. For-profit firms may behave as if they
care about quality if they compete for customers with nonprofit
firms.6 A for-profit center chooses Q to maximize U(Q, 
(Q))
subject only to the 
(Q) constraint, whereas a nonprofit center
chooses Q to maximize U(Q, 







l is the minimum level of profit needed
to survive in the long run (which could be negative), and 
u is
the legal upper limit on the profit that can be earned by a
nonprofit center. As noted, cost minimization is assumed in
both cases. The first-order condition (FOC) determining the
optimal choice of quality in a for-profit center is
UQ  U
MR  MC  0, (3)




u is not binding, then equation (3)
also characterizes the behavior of a nonprofit center. If 
 

u is binding, then the FOC is 
(Qj)  R(Qj)  C(Qj) 

u, where R is revenue and C is cost. If 
l  
 is binding,
then the FOC is 
(Qj)  R(Qj)  C(Qj)  
l.
III. Empirical Implementation
A considerable amount of specification searching led us
to choose a relatively simple form of the cost function. We
specify the logarithm of cost as a linear function of quality,
with no interactions between quality and other variables,
and no higher-order terms in quality. The semi-log specifi-
cation gave the best fit and the most sensible results. There
was little evidence of direct interactions between quality
and other determinants of cost, although the semi-log func-
tion implicitly interacts quality with all other variables in
determining cost. The specification is
Ln Cj  0  1Qj  2Hj  3gj  4Hj
2  5gj
2






The higher-order terms in H and g are included because
they improved the fit of the model.7 We later discuss the
sensitivity of the main results to alternative specifications of
the cost function. It is possible to test the estimated cost
function for consistency with the restrictions implied by
cost minimization, but we do not do so. The reason is that
we have little information on the nonlabor determinants of
cost. Labor accounts for approximately 70% of cost on
average in the data we use, but without information on the
prices of nonlabor inputs we cannot impose and test
adding-up constraints. For example, rent per square foot is
not available for centers that use partially or completely
donated space, and our attempts to obtain this information
from local real estate agencies generated incomplete data
that did not contain much within-state variation. Similarly,
there is no significant variation in the prices of materials
(such as paper towels, snacks and crayons), because of
competition at the wholesale level within states.
Quality, child hours, group size, and wages may be endog-
enous in the cost function if there is unobserved heterogeneity
across firms.8 For example, firms that have high costs as a
result of high wages may also have high costs for other reasons
that we cannot measure, as a result of being located in a
high-cost area. Firms that economize on cost by using large
group size may economize on cost in other ways that cannot be
observed. Staff who are dedicated to providing high-quality
care might help firms reduce cost in ways that cannot be
measured, such as providing greater effort per hour. Our
identification strategy assumes that location within a state
(state dummies are included in the cost function in Zj), as
defined by a center’s ZIP code or town, is uncorrelated with
technology but is correlated with these potentially endogenous
regressors. In other words, we assume that the location of a
center is exogenous and that location affects cost only via its
effects on g, Q, H, and W1  WT. We operationalize this by
using ZIP code or town dummies as instruments in first-stage
equations for g, Q, H, and the W’s.
5 Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) use output rather than quality as the
argument of the utility function. Quality seems the more natural variable
to use here because it is plausible that centers may care about quality and
it is unlikely that size or market share is important in day care. See
Hansmann (1996), Weisbrod (1998), and Rose-Ackerman (1996) for
discussion of the behavior of nonprofit firms.
6 Tabulations from the Profile of Child Care Settings (PCS) data (Kisker
et al., 1991) indicate that 25.5% of nonprofit day care centers gave
“promoting child development” as their primary goal, 15.1% gave “pre-
paring children for school,” 6.2% gave “providing compensatory educa-
tion for disadvantaged children,” and 1.4% gave teaching appreciation for
culture. These can all be considered quality-related goals. The correspond-
ing figures for for-profit centers are 13.1%, 12.0%, 0.2%, and 0.5%,
respectively. We computed these figures from the PCS data.
7 The specification in equation (1) includes the number of groups (G),
but, in equation (4), we include group size, g  H/G, which is just a
transformation of G, conditional on H.
8 It is possible that some of the child and family characteristics in Mj and
some of the center characteristics in Zj are endogenous as well. We ignore
this possibility because of the very large number of parameters that would
have to be estimated if models for Mj and Zj were added.
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Another potential problem is that not all centers are at an
interior solution with respect to the choice of staff: some
centers do not use any staff of certain types. This is true
regardless of how staff are classified. One way to deal with
this is to include all centers in the analysis by assigning
imputed wages to centers that do not use specific types of
staff.9 But theory implies that these centers would respond
differently to changes in wages than would centers at the
full interior solution. Instead, we estimate the cost function
using the subsample of centers at the full interior solution.
A disadvantage of this approach is a smaller sample size:
266 centers use all types of labor input based on the
classification described below, whereas the full sample con-
tains 370 centers with non-missing data. We report below on
the robustness of the results to selection of the sample on the
basis of this possibly endogenous variable.
The price equation is specified as a double-log model:
Ln Pj  m j   ln Qj  Ij  uj, (5)
where Ij is the proportion of infant-toddlers among center
j’s children,
m( j) is an intercept that is specific to the location m( j) of
center j,
 and  are parameters, and
uj is a disturbance.
This functional form consistently fit the data better than
did the alternatives. In the estimation, we specify the
location-specific intercepts by dummies at either the ZIP
code or town level. Thus, the intercept of the price function
is allowed to vary freely across towns or ZIP codes, which
are assumed to constitute the relevant markets. The quality
parameter, , is restricted to be the same across ZIP codes
or towns within a state, but is allowed to vary across states.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the weighted
average fee of the center by age group of children, weighted
by the proportion of children in each age group. We include
the proportion of infant-toddlers as an explanatory variable
because fees tend to be higher for younger children. Exper-
imentation with the equation suggested that conditional on
ZIP code fixed-effects unobserved heterogeneity is not a
problem, so we estimate it by ordinary least squares
(OLS).10





1, where  is allowed to
differ between for-profit and nonprofit firms. Profit maxi-
mization implies   0. The FOC for a for-profit center
implies that
MCQ  MRQ  
/1  Q   (6)
where
Revenue  R  HjPj  exp{m( j)   ln Qj  Ij}Hj,
MR  R/Q  Rj/Qj,
MC  [ ln C/Q]C(Q), and
 is measurement error in MC  MR.
Equation (6) is a nonlinear implicit equation for the
optimal Q. Given estimates of  and the parameters of the
cost and price equations, along with data on Ij, Hj, and the
other arguments of the cost function, it is straightforward to
solve equation (6) numerically for the implied optimal value
of Q.




is not binding has a FOC of the same form as equation (6).
A nonprofit center that would have chosen 
  
u in the
absence of a constraint will be forced to set Q so that

(Q)  R(Q)  C(Q)  
u. We assume that 
u is known
to the firm but unobserved by us. It can therefore be treated
as a disturbance. Similarly, a firm that hits the 
l  

constraint will be forced to set 
  
l, and we treat 
l as
observed by the firm but unknown to us. This results in a
switching regression model with unknown regime. We do









l). The model governing
the choice of Q in the unconstrained regime is equation (6),
and in the constrained regimes is R(Q)  C(Q)  
u or
R(Q)  C(Q)  
l, which are implicit equations for Q. We
assume that   N(0, 2) (with  allowed to differ by profit
status), 
u  N(u, u
2), and 
l  N(l, l
2). The probability
that a nonprofit center is constrained by 




* is the unconstrained level of profit, which is




l  MCQ*  MRQ*
(7)
 1  Q*/
where Q* is the unconstrained choice for Q, which is found
by solving equation (6) numerically. The probability that a




*  PrMCQ*  MRQ*
(8)
 1  Q*/  
u.
Taking the parameters of the cost and fee equations as
given, the likelihood function contribution for a nonprofit
child care center is
L  RQ  CQ  l)/l)l]
l[((RQ
 CQ  u)/u)/u]
u[(/)/)]1lu,
9 Mocan (1997) followed this approach, and we later examine the
sensitivity of our results to this alternative approach.
10 We augmented the specification in equation (5) with fifteen charac-
teristics of centers and four characteristics of the parents of the children
served by the centers. Conditional on the ZIP code fixed effects, we could
not reject the hypothesis that these characteristics could be excluded from
the regression. Most of the coefficient estimates on the characteristics
were insignificantly different from zero individually as well.
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where  is the probability density function of a standard
normal variate. The parameters to be estimated are , , l,
u, l, and u. We restrict  to the unit interval. Testing the
hypothesis of profit maximization involves a restriction on
 and is straightforward. The likelihood contribution for a
for-profit center is L  (/)/.
With estimates of , u, l and the parameters of the cost
and fee equations, we solve numerically for the quality
supply function, Q  Q*(, W1, . . . , WT, H, g, R, M),
which shows how quality supplied varies with the determi-
nants of price and cost. The quality supply function for
nonprofits accounts for the different regimes by weighting
by the estimated values of the ’s. Because price is deter-
mined by the firm’s choice of quality, we cannot compute a
conventional supply function. Instead, we simulate supply
behavior by varying the intercept of the price function (),
and solving for each firm’s profit-maximizing choice of
quality for alternative values of . We then average over
firms. This measures how a firm would respond to an
exogenous change in the intercept of the price-quality rela-
tionship in its market.
IV. Data
We use data collected from day care centers in California,
Colorado, Connecticut, and North Carolina as part of the
Cost, Quality, and Outcomes (CQO) Study. A random sam-
ple of fifty for-profit and fifty nonprofit day care centers
providing full-time, year-round care was selected from
specified regions within each state.11 Interviewers visited
each center in the spring of 1993 and gathered detailed
information on costs, revenues, donations, quality, and the
human capital characteristics and wages of every worker. In
addition to information collected from interviewing the
center director, two rooms at each center were randomly
chosen to be observed: one preschool and one infant-toddler
room if the center served both age groups.12 Trained ob-
servers visited each center for one day to observe the rooms.
The Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale (ECERS)
and the Infant-Toddler Environment Rating Scale (ITERS)
were used to measure the quality of care provided in the
selected rooms. These instruments contain approximately
thirty items characterizing personal care routines, furnish-
ings, language-reasoning experience, fine and gross motor
activities, creative activities, and social development. Each
item is scored on a seven-point scale with a score of 1
representing inadequate and a score of 7 representing excellent.
These are widely used instruments, and have good psychomet-
ric properties.13 In essence, they formalize the notions of
quality that a well-educated parent might look for when visit-
ing a center, such as the nature of the interactions between staff
and children; the developmental appropriateness of the mate-
rials, toys, playground equipment, and activities; and the hy-
giene and food preparation practices of the center. (The appen-
dix provides a list of items and examples of instructions to the
observers on how to score items.) We use the average score
across the items as our measure of quality. The descriptive
statistics shown in table 1 indicate that average quality is
higher in nonprofit centers; this is due largely to a pronounced
difference between the quality of for-profit and nonprofit cen-
ters in North Carolina.14
Cost is the sum of annual wage and salary expenditure,
nonwage benefits, staff education costs, subcontracting
costs, food costs, other operating expenses, the estimated
value of in-kind donations (food, volunteer services, and
supplies), overhead, insurance, and occupancy costs (rent or
mortgage, utilities, repair and maintenance). This is a com-
prehensive measure of total cost that treats all inputs as
variable. Hence, the cost function we estimate is a long-run
cost function, in contrast to the short-run cost function
estimated by Mocan (1997) using the same data. We expect
cost to be more inelastic with respect to quality in the long
run than in the short run. For centers that use donated space,
the annual rental value of the space is calculated and treated
as occupancy cost. For centers that receive financial help
with rent, the discount they receive on rent is added to
occupancy costs. Because our aim is to estimate a long-run
cost function in which all inputs are treated as variable, we
include all costs.15 The rationale for including the value of
donated inputs is that a cost-minimizing firm will account
for all costs when making decisions, including costs that are
implicit, and full cost is clearly the relevant concept for
policy purposes. Excluding the cost of donated inputs would
make it appear that nonprofits are more efficient than
for-profits, which is unlikely a priori. Annual cost is divided
by 52 to obtain a measure of weekly total cost that is used
in the estimation. The center director provided information
on the total number of children enrolled in the center by age,
average hours per child by age, and the number of rooms by
age. As shown in table 1, average weekly cost per child is
11 The regions were Los Angeles County; the “Front Range” area of
Colorado Springs, Denver, Boulder, Fort Collins, and Greeley; the Hart-
ford-New Haven corridor; and the “Triad” area of Winston-Salem,
Greensboro, and Burlington.
12 Infant-toddler rooms were defined as those in which the majority of
children were less than 2.5 years old. Preschool classrooms were defined
as those in which the majority of children were at least 2.5 years old, but
not yet in kindergarten. No school-age or kindergarten classrooms were
observed.
13 See Harms and Clifford (1980) and Harms, Cryer, and Clifford (1990)
for details. Several other instruments were used as well, but we focus on
the ECERS and ITERS as our measure of quality. Inter-rater reliability at
each site and between sites was very high for all instruments used
(Helburn, 1995).
14 Additional descriptive information by state and profit status can be
found in Mocan (1997) and Helburn (1995). Our measure of quality is a
simple average of the quality of the two observed rooms in a center. We
also experimented with a weighted average measure in which the quality
score of a room was weighted by the proportion of rooms of its age group.
The results were virtually identical to those we report here.
15 Nonprofit centers that rely heavily on donated space may face a
constraint on expansion if they already use the space to capacity. We
added a measure of square feet of space to the cost function for nonprofits
and found that its coefficient estimate was highly significant, but the basic
implications of the analysis were unchanged.
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slightly higher in nonprofit centers. Average cost per unit of
quality is lower in nonprofit centers, but average cost per
child per unit of quality is virtually identical in for-profit
and nonprofit centers.
The center director provided a roster of all workers in the
center, including data on the hourly wage or annual salary,
hours of work per week, years of experience, tenure at the
center, training, age, race, gender, the age group of children
served, and the worker’s job title. After considerable exper-
imentation, we classified staff into three categories by years
of formal education: high school graduate or less, some
college, and college graduate or more. The survey contains
detailed information on the specific type and source of
child-development-related training of each staff member. In
preliminary analyses, we found that this additional training
information was for the most part redundant once staff were
categorized by years of schooling. Table 1 shows descrip-
tive statistics on staff hours and hourly compensation by
staff type. Compensation consists of average hourly earn-
ings plus estimated average fringe benefits per hour.16 Com-
pensation rises with education, but not by as much as in
other jobs held by women (Blau, 2001; Mocan & Tekin,
2000). Nonprofit centers pay 9%–18% higher wages than do
for-profits.
Group size is derived from a roster of all the rooms in the
center that lists the number of children enrolled in each room
and their age group. Also available are alternative measures
based on the number of children present in each room on the
day of the interview and on measures of group size recorded
during the morning observation period for the two rooms
observed. The results of the analysis using these alternative
measures were similar to the results based on enrollment.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the room-specific
family characteristics of the enrolled children (Mj). These
were collected in a survey instrument distributed to the
parents of children in the observed rooms. We use three of
the variables available in this survey that were consistently
important across specifications: family income, marital sta-
tus, and the percentage of families in which at least one
parent has graduated from college. Table 1 also describes
the center characteristics included in the analysis (Zj).
These variables are included to measure “fixed factors”
that may affect cost. They include state dummies; an
16 Wages are averaged over all staff with a given level of education. The
center’s total expenditure on fringe benefits is divided by total staff hours
to measure the average hourly value of fringe benefits.
TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
All For-profit Nonprofit
Total weekly cost 5,920 (3,700) 6,010 (3,079) 5,824 (4,264)
Enrollment 75 (47) 81 (49) 68 (44)
Average weekly hours of care provided 2,887 (1,884) 3,022 (1,767) 2,745 (1,994)
Average weekly cost per child 89 (41) 88 (42) 91 (40)
Average quality of care 4.1 (0.9) 3.9 (0.9) 4.2 (0.9)
California 4.5 (0.9) 4.3 (0.8) 4.6 (0.9)
Colorado 4.1 (0.8) 4.0 (0.7) 4.3 (0.8)
Connecticut 4.2 (1.0) 4.3 (1.0) 4.0 (1.0)
North Carolina 3.5 (0.9) 3.0 (0.7) 4.0 (0.9)
Total weekly cost/quality 1,494 (900) 1,560 (770) 1,425 (1,017)
Average cost per child/quality 22.6 (10.8) 22.5 (9.9) 22.6 (11.6)
Average group size 14.6 (6.5) 14.4 (6.9) 14.8 (6.1)
Average weekly teacher hours per room
Educ  12 31.4 (21.6) 28.6 (21.0) 34.3 (21.8)
Educ  13–15 30.9 (21.8) 29.4 (21.0) 32.3 (22.6)
Educ  16 29.3 (22.9) 26.7 (20.5) 32.0 (25.0)
Average teaching staff compensation/hour
Educ  12 6.86 (2.02) 6.52 (1.68) 7.22 (2.29)
Educ  13–15 7.75 (2.80) 7.43 (3.11) 8.10 (2.38)
Educ  16 9.71 (4.24) 8.90 (4.10) 10.55 (4.23)
For-profit center 0.51 (0.50) 1.00 (0) 0 (0)
Percentage of children white 71 (29) 79 (22) 63 (33)
Meets higher standards (pubregul) 0.06 (0.25) 0 0.13 (0.34)
50% of revenue from subsidies (pubsub) 0.09 (0.28) 0.03 (0.17) 0.15 (0.35)
Church-affiliated 0.22 (0.42) 0 0.45 (0.50)
Years in operation 13.1 (12.5) 9.8 (8.3) 16.7 (15.1)
Proportion of infant-toddler rooms 0.33 (0.26) 0.39 (0.24) 0.27 (0.28)
Proportion of preschooler rooms 0.48 (0.25) 0.42 (0.22) 0.55 (0.27)
Annual family income/1000 53 (24) 60 (24) 45 (23)
Proportion of children with married parents 0.71 (0.24) 0.77 (0.19) 0.65 (0.28)
Proportion of children with at least one college graduate parent 0.45 (0.26) 0.51 (0.25) 0.39 (0.26)
Located in California 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43)
Located in Colorado 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45)
Located in Connecticut 0.27 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43)
Located in North Carolina 0.23 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.25 (0.43)
Average hourly fee 2.10 (0.83) 2.26 (0.75) 1.94 (0.87)
Number of centers 266 136 130
Entries are means and, in parentheses, standard deviations.
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indicator of for-profit status; indicators of whether the
center receives public money tied to meeting higher than
normal standards (pubregul);17 whether the center re-
ceives more than half its revenue from public grants,
public fees, and USDA reimbursement (pubsub); whether
the center has a religious affiliation; the center’s age, the
percentage of children who are white; and the proportion
of infant-toddler and preschooler-age rooms in the center.
The age and racial composition of children served will
affect cost if they affect the marginal product of staff
input in the production of quality.
As noted in section II, we ignore state regulations on
group size, staff-child ratio, and staff qualifications. If
regulations affected the behavior of centers, then we
would expect to find many centers with a group size and
staff-child ratio at or close to the regulation. Elsewhere
(Blau & Mocan, 2000), we present a detailed analysis of
compliance with regulations and the effects of regula-
tions on day care center behavior. We show that most
centers have more staff per child and smaller group size
than is required by regulations. Up to 20% of centers are
out of compliance with regulations, often by a substantial
margin (for example, a group size of twenty when the
regulated maximum is fifteen). This suggests that regu-
lations are not strictly enforced and thus need not be
incorporated in the analysis.
V. Results
A. Cost Function Estimates
The baseline cost function results, presented in table 2,
were estimated by OLS. We later report additional results
based on instrumental variable (IV) and selectivity-
corrected estimation. We treat the OLS estimates as a
baseline because evidence presented here indicates that the
hypothesis that quality, quantity, wages, and group size are
exogenous cannot be rejected. The main finding in table 2 is
that quality is positively related to cost, with a coefficient
estimate of 0.056 that is significantly different from zero.
The estimate implies that a unit increase in quality (equal to
about one standard deviation) raises cost by 5.6% on aver-
age. Cost increases with output at a decreasing rate, with the
marginal effect remaining positive throughout the observed
range of output in the data. Cost is positively related to
wages of all three teacher types, with the wage rate of the
least-educated workers showing the biggest effect. Costs are
on average similar in Colorado and California (the omitted
category), higher in Connecticut, and lower in North Caro-
lina. Costs are higher for older centers, centers that volun-
tarily meet higher than required standards (pubregul), cen-
ters that serve a higher proportion of infants and toddlers,
and centers serving children of well-educated parents. Costs
are lower for church-affiliated centers. There is no evidence
that costs differ between for-profit and nonprofit centers.
More importantly, in a specification (not shown here) that
included an interaction between profit status and quality, the
coefficient on the interaction term was small and insignifi-
cantly different from zero.
Some of the implications of these estimates are shown in
table 3, which presents marginal cost and the elasticity of
cost with respect to quality, overall and by state, evaluated
at each firm’s observed level of quality, and averaged over
firms. On average, marginal cost is positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero in for-profit and nonprofit centers
in all states. The average elasticity of cost with respect to
quality is 0.22–0.24, which is somewhat lower than Mo-
can’s (1997) estimate of 0.40 using the same data. The most
likely reason for our lower estimate is that we estimate a
long-run cost function in which all factors are assumed to be
variable, whereas Mocan estimated a short-run variable cost
function that treated capital inputs such as building and
equipment as fixed. Figure 1 illustrates how marginal cost
varies with the level of quality, based on simulations that set
each firm’s quality to the same level while holding all other
variables fixed at their observed values, with the results
averaged across firms. Marginal cost rises gradually from
approximately $300 to $400 as quality increases.
B. Price Function Estimates
Linear regression estimates of the quality coefficients
from four alternative specifications of the price function
are presented in table 4. The test statistics shown in the
lower part of the table indicate that the hypothesis that
the price function intercepts are identical across ZIP
17 This group includes Head Start programs, centers in which 20% or
more of the enrollment are special-needs children, special preschool
programs sponsored by the state or federal Department of Education, and
other special programs in Connecticut and California.
TABLE 2.—LOG WEEKLY TOTAL COST FUNCTION PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Quality (Q) 0.056 (0.023)*
Annual hours of care/1000 (H) 0.0085 (0.0007)**
H2/10000 0.144 (0.020)**
Group size (g) 0.0009 (0.0094)
g2/100 0.028 (0.044)
H*g 0.28 (0.22)
Teacher wage, educ.  12 0.027 (0.014)
Teacher wage, educ.  13–15 0.019 (0.009)*
Teacher wage, educ.  16 0.010 (0.005)*




Percentage of children white 0.0005 (0.0008)
More than 50% of revenue from subsidies (pubsub) 0.018 (0.084)
Years in operation 0.0026 (0.0017)
Church affiliated 0.17 (0.06)**
Meets higher standards (pubregul) 0.29 (0.10)**
Parents college 0.22 (0.10)*
Parent income 0.0006 (0.0012)
Parents married 0.039 (0.111)
Proportion of infant-toddler rooms 0.29 (0.11)**
Proportion of preschooler rooms 0.12 (0.11)
Intercept 6.72 (0.21)**
R2(n) 0.77 (266)
* and ** indicate significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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codes or towns was not rejected at the 5% level for any
of the states except California for the specification using
town dummies. The hypothesis was not rejected at the 1%
level in this case. Thus, the specification in the first row
is not rejected when tested against the specifications in
the second and third rows. This implies that there is
relatively little variation within states in the price-quality
locus. The fourth row presents results from a specifica-
tion in which approximately two dozen center character-
istics were included along with quality. In all states
except North Carolina, the hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients on these characteristics are jointly zero was not
rejected at the 5% level of significance. Thus, we focus
mainly on the results in the first row, with no location
dummies and no regressors other than quality and the
proportion of infants and toddlers (although we present
some sensitivity analysis). The results in the first row
indicate that the market rewards higher-quality care with
a significantly higher price in three of the four states,
with elasticities of 0.40 in California, 0.32 in Colorado,
0.22 in Connecticut, and 0.13 in North Carolina.18 Table
3 shows the average level of marginal revenue evaluated
at the observed level of quality in each center, based on
the results from the first row of table 4. Marginal revenue is
positive and significantly different from zero in all states
and for both types of firms. Figure 1 shows that marginal
revenue declines sharply with quality up to about Q  3
and more slowly thereafter, but remains positive at all levels
of quality. (This is an implication of the functional form of
the price equation together with a positive coefficient on ln
Q in the price function.) Marginal cost and marginal reve-
nue intersect at about Q  4.3 in the for-profit sector and
Q  4.1 in the nonprofit sector.
Interpreting the price functions as market price-quality
loci, they are determined by both preferences and tech-
nology and therefore do not directly reveal information
about either. However, there will be a positive price-
quality slope only if parents are willing to pay more for
higher-quality care and if producing higher-quality care
increases cost. The cost function estimates show directly
that the latter condition is satisfied. The positive quality
slope in the price function implies that parents are on
average willing to pay more for higher-quality care, with
the possible exception of North Carolina. Blau and Hagy
(1998) did not find much evidence that parents are
willing to pay more for regulated attributes of child care
such as group size, staff-child ratio, and trained provid-
ers. However, the quality measure we use here is more
closely related to child development outcomes, so it is
plausible that parents would be willing to pay more for
high-quality arrangements even if they are not willing to
pay more for arrangements with better regulatable inputs.
C. Objective Function Estimates
The main finding from estimation of the firm objective
function is that the coefficient on quality ( in equation (6))
is zero for both for-profit and nonprofit firms. This was true
in every one of the numerous specifications estimated. This
implies that both types of firms behave as profit maximizers.
The hypothesis that   0 was never rejected.19
D. The Supply of Quality
As noted, we simulate supply behavior by varying the
intercept of the supply function (), and solving for each
firm’s optimal choice of quality for alternative values of
. We than average over firms. This can be thought of as
measuring how a firm would respond to an exogenous
change in the intercept of the price-quality relationship in
its market. It can also be thought of as the effect of an
unconditional (on quality) subsidy per hour of care pro-
vided. To provide a price metric that can be used to
compute a supply elasticity, the value of  underlying
each simulation is converted to a value of P by evaluating
the price function at a fixed level of quality (the sample
mean).20 The estimates are based on the cost function
18 As noted previously, the quality measure we use is an average of the
scores on the 32 individual ECERS items and 28 ITERS items. We
reestimated the price equation including the individual item scores and
found that we could not reject combining the items into a single average
score for any state.
19 The estimates imply that fewer than 10% of nonprofits are constrained
by either the upper or lower bound on profit. (u and l were both
estimated to be less than 0.05 on average.)
20 Specifically, let s and t be two values of  used in the simula-
tions. For each for-profit firm, we solve the equation MC(Q) 
MR(Q)  0 numerically for Qs, the optimal value of Q given s, where
MR  R/Q, R  exp{s   ln Q  Ij}Hj, MC  1C, and C 
exp{0  1Q  2Hj  3gj  4Hj
2  5gj
2  6Hjgj  7Rj 
8Mj  ¥ 8iWji}. We do the same for Qt, the optimal value of Q
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATES OF WEEKLY MARGINAL COST, MARGINAL REVENUE,
AND ELASTICITY OF COST WITH RESPECT TO QUALITY
For-profit Nonprofit
All
Marginal cost 332 (134) 319 (126)
Marginal revenue 453 (121) 371 (103)
Elasticity of cost wrt quality 0.22 (0.09) 0.24 (0.09)
California
Marginal cost 391 (158) 359 (143)
Marginal revenue 713 (415) 655 (377)
Elasticity of cost wrt quality 0.24 (0.10) 0.26 (0.10)
Colorado
Marginal cost 325 (133) 308 (122)
Marginal revenue 556 (229) 395 (165)
Elasticity of cost wrt quality 0.22 (0.09) 0.24 (0.10)
Connecticut
Marginal cost 293 (122) 299 (117)
Marginal revenue 319 (145) 269 (127)
Elasticity of cost wrt quality 0.24 (0.10) 0.23 (0.09)
North Carolina
Marginal cost 338 (135) 309 (125)
Marginal revenue 244 (117) 169 (81)
Elasticity of cost wrt quality 0.17 (0.07) 0.23 (0.09)
Standard errors (in parentheses) were computed by taking 1,000 random draws from the joint
distribution of all the parameters, computing the variable of interest (for example, average marginal cost),
and using the standard deviation of the resulting distribution.
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FIGURE 1A.—ESTIMATED AVERAGE MARGINAL COST AND MARGINAL REVENUE, FOR-PROFIT CENTERS
FIGURE 1B.—ESTIMATED AVERAGE MARGINAL COST AND MARGINAL REVENUE, NONPROFIT CENTERS
THE SUPPLY OF QUALITY IN CHILD CARE CENTERS 491
results in table 2 and the price function results in the first
row of table 4, without location dummies.21
The simulated quality supply function for all states com-
bined is shown in figure 2 separately for for-profits and
nonprofits. The supply functions are upward sloping, and
the average arc price elasticity of supply, shown in table 5
by state and overall, is positive in every case. The average
price elasticity is 0.66 among for-profits and 0.48 among
nonprofits. These figures indicate that an increase in the
intercept of the price function that causes a 10% increase in
price for a given quality would cause firms to raise quality
by 6.6% and 4.8%, respectively. The more-elastic supply of
quality in the for-profit sector is consistent with the notion
that many nonprofits face constraints on improving quality
due to reliance on donations. In economic terms, these
moderately large elasticities result from the fact that cost is
estimated to increase only modestly with increases in qual-
ity, whereas the market price can be increased fairly sub-
stantially as quality increases. From a policy perspective,
the simulation results can be interpreted as the effects that
would result from increased demand for child care gener-
ated by child care subsidies to consumers. Thus, consumer
subsidies such as the Dependent Care Tax Credit and the
Child Care and Development Fund that are not targeted
specifically toward high-quality child care are nevertheless
likely to increase the supply of higher-quality child care.
The quality supply elasticity appears to be larger in the
lower-quality states (Colorado and North Carolina).
Because the major cost of child care is labor, another
policy of interest is a wage subsidy for child care labor.
Figure 3 shows the results of quality supply simulations in
which wage rates of the three types of child care labor are
set at alternative values. Quality supply appears to be fairly
sensitive to the wage rate, with average elasticities, shown
in table 5, of 0.77 to 0.80. Thus, wage subsidies could
be another method of inducing an increase in the supply of
quality in child care.22
E. Sensitivity Analysis
Table 6 reports price and wage elasticities of quality
supply from a variety of different specifications, averaged
over all four states. Row 1 of each panel reproduces the
results from table 5, based on OLS estimates of the cost
function in table 2 and the price function estimates in the
first row of table 4. We refer to this as the baseline
specification. Row 2 reports results based on IV estimation
of the cost function, treating quality, output, group size, and
wages as endogenous, and using ZIP code dummies as
identifying instruments. The IV estimate of the coefficient
on quality in the cost function was 0.053 (0.025) compared
to the OLS estimate of 0.056 (0.023). Hence, there is little
evidence that quality is endogenous in the cost function. The
for-profit supply elasticities in row 2 based on the IV
estimates are very similar to the baseline estimates, whereas
the nonprofit elasticities are much smaller in absolute value.
Given the absence of evidence of endogeneity bias, we put
more weight on the first-row estimates.
given t. We then compute the arc elasticity [(Qs  Qt)/(Qs 
Qt)]/[(Ps  Pt)/(Ps  Pt)], where Ps 	 exp{s   ln Q  Ij}, Pt 	
exp{t   ln Q  Ij}, and ln Q is the sample mean value of ln Q
(not the simulated value). Finally, we average over firms. For nonprof-
its, we follow the same approach except that we also compute Qsl and
Qsu as the solutions to 
(Q)  l and 
(Q)  u, respectively. These
are the optimal Q’s given that the lower and upper bound constraints
on profit are binding, whereas Qs is the optimal Q given that neither
constraint is binding. The simulated optimal quality is then computed
as the weighted average lQsl  uQsu  (1  l  u)Qs, where the
’s (defined in equations (7) and (8)) are the probabilities of being at
the profit bounds. Note that the estimated value of   0 is used for
both for-profits and nonprofits. The estimates of l and u are $233/
week and $21/week, respectively.
21 As noted, we assume that the quantity of services (H) and character-
istics of the families served (M) are determined by consumers in response
to the price and quality offered by the firm. However, we do not allow H
and M to respond to changes in  in the simulations. The simulations
should be interpreted with this point in mind.
22 These simulations use the same method described in footnote 19,
using the wage rates Wi as the forcing variables instead of 
TABLE 4.—ELASTICITY OF PRICE WITH RESPECT TO QUALITY FROM FEE REGRESSIONS
California Colorado Connecticut North Carolina
Coefficient on Ln Quality
No geographic controls 0.40 (0.16)** 0.32 (0.11)*** 0.22 (0.10)** 0.13 (0.08)
ZIP codes 0.03 (0.24) 0.16 (0.19) 0.26 (0.13)** 0.09 (0.11)
Towns 0.16 (0.19) 0.25 (0.11)** 0.19 (0.12)* 0.16 (0.09)
No geographic controls; includes other regressors 0.51 (0.18)*** 0.08 (0.14) 0.17 (0.10)* 0.18 (0.09)**
Test Statistics
ZIP code effects are zero 1.73  F(71,25) 0.82  F(56,43) 1.49  F(54,44) 0.97  F(45,44)
Town effects are zero 1.79  F(53,43)** 1.45  F(9,90) 1.06  F(33,65) 1.00  F(26,73)
Other regressor effects are zero 1.42  F(18,76) 1.36  F(20,74) 1.63  F(17,81) 3.30  F(21,73)***
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly fee. The figures reported in the upper panel are the coefficient on the logirthm of the average ECERS-ITERS score. All models include as an additional
regressor the percentage of children under age 3. Additional regressors in the model in row 4 are dummies for part day, extended day, Head Start, public school sponsored, before and after school care, summer
camp program offered, evening care, weekend care, sick care, 24-hour care, bilingual staff, for-profit, meets higher standards voluntarily, receives more than 50% of revenue from public subsidies, on-site,
church-sponsored, Waldorf program, and national chain; and percentage of children subsidized, age of the center, and full-time equivalent enrollment. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level, respectively.
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Row 3 reports results from selectivity-corrected cost
function estimates. Recall that the sample on which the cost
function is estimated includes only centers that use all three
types of labor. To determine whether this causes selection
bias, we used the full sample of centers to estimate a probit
model of the decision to use all three types of labor, with
ZIP code dummies as identifying variables in the first stage.
A selectivity correction term computed from the first-stage
probit estimates was then included in the cost function
model estimated on the selected sample, following Heck-
man (1979). The quality coefficient in this specification was
0.056 (0.021), identical to the OLS estimate, and the elas-
ticities in row 3 are thus very similar to the baseline
estimates.
Row 4 reports elasticities based on price functions with
town dummies in the fee equation (from row 3 of table 4),
and row 5 reports results based on including ZIP code
dummies in the fee equation (from row 2 of table 4). These
cause some fairly large changes in the elasticities in some
cases. However, the hypothesis that town and ZIP code
dummies could be excluded from the fee equations was
never rejected at the 1% level of significance. Hence, the
sensitivity of the results to this specification change is not of
great importance.
Row 6 reports results based on adding interactions be-
tween states dummies and quality in the cost function. The
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on these interac-
tions were jointly zero was not rejected. Row 7 reports
results based on adding an interaction between quality and
the dummy for receiving more than half of center revenue
from public subsidies (pubsub) in the cost function. This
was the only case in which a quality interaction effect was
significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimate on
quality in this specification was 0.075 (0.023) and the
quality-pubsub interaction coefficient was 0.26 (0.07).
This does not affect the elasticities for the for-profits much,
but results in much smaller elasticities in absolute value for
the nonprofits. Row 8 reports results in which the full
sample of centers was used in the cost function estimation,
with wages imputed for centers that did not use a given type
TABLE 5.—ELASTICITY OF QUALITY SUPPLY WITH RESPECT
TO PRICE AND WAGE RATE
All States CA CO CT NC
For-profit
Price elasticity 0.66 0.63 0.58 0.69 0.89
Wage elasticity 0.80 0.73 0.86 0.65 1.00
Nonprofit
Price elasticity 0.48 0.45 0.76 0.35 0.84
Wage elasticity 0.77 0.56 0.96 0.58 1.04
The ECERS/ITERS quality scale has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum of 7. These bounds were
imposed when solving for the optical level of quality. The wage simulations vary the wages of all three
teacher types jointly. The wage rates shown in figure 3 are for the lowest-education group (high school
graduate or less). The wages of college attendees in the simulations are $2 more than for the lowest group,
and the wage rate for college graduates is $4 more. The simulations are based on the parameter estimates
in tables 2 and 4. The elasticities are the average arc elasticities from one simulated value to the next,
averaged over the simulations. The simulated values are shown in figures 2 and 3 for all states combined.
FIGURE 2.—QUALITY SUPPLIED AT ALTERNATIVE PRICES
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of labor, based on the state average for that type of labor by
for-profit/nonprofit status. The quality coefficient in this
version of the cost function was 0.068 (0.020) compared to
0.056 (0.023) in the baseline model. This has little impact
on the average elasticities, although some of the state-
specific elasticities not shown in the table did change
substantially. Finally, row 9 treats nonprofits as if they faced
no upper or lower bounds on profit. This hardly affects the
results.
VI. Conclusions
One of the goals of federal and many state child care
policies is to improve the quality of child care. This paper
analyzes the behavior of suppliers of child care and reports
results that are somewhat encouraging from a policy per-
spective. The cost of improving quality is estimated to be
fairly modest, and parents are on average willing to pay
between 0.13% and 0.40% more for child care with 1%
higher quality, depending on the state. The resulting price
elasticity of quality supply is 0.66 among for-profit suppli-
ers and 0.48 among nonprofits, averaged across states. The
average wage elasticity of quality supply is about 0.8.
Thus, policies that would be relatively straightforward to
implement—such as across-the-board child care price and
wage subsidies—would have moderately large effects on
the average level of child care quality supplied according to
the results presented here. Such policies are straightforward
because they do not impose heavy information requirements
for implementation. Alternative policies that might have
larger effects on quality would have to be targeted at centers
that are willing to maintain a given level of quality or
achieve a specified amount of quality improvement, but
TABLE 6.—PRICE AND WAGES ELASTICITIES OF QUALITY SUPPLY
FOR ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Price Elasticities
Specification For-profit Nonprofit
1. Baseline 0.66 0.48
2. Cost function estimated by IV 0.62 0.03
3. Cost function selectivity-corr. 0.65 0.51
4. Town dummies in fee equation 0.73 0.81
5. ZIP code dummies in fee equation 0.34 0.27
6. State dummies  quality in cost function 0.42 0.21
7. Pubsub  quality in cost function 0.66 0.08
8. Full sample, imputed wages 0.66 0.33
9. No extra constraints for nonprofits 0.69 0.57
Wage Elasticities
1. Baseline 0.80 0.77
2. Cost function estimated by IV 0.75 0.39
3. Cost function selectivity-corr. 0.80 0.77
4. Town dummies in fee equation 0.78 0.87
5. ZIP code dummies in fee equation 0.33 0.27
6. State dummies  quality in cost function 0.25 0.16
7. Pubsub  quality in cost function 0.60 0.08
8. Full sample, imputed wages 0.70 0.56
9. No extra constraints for nonprofits 0.78 0.77
The baseline specification uses results from the cost function estimates in table 2 and the fee equation
estimates in table 4. The cost function in the baseline specification is estimated by OLS, and the fee
equation in the baseline specification does not contain any location dummies. The results in rows 2–9 use
the baseline specification except for the difference noted in the first column.
FIGURE 3.—QUALITY SUPPLIED AT ALTERNATIVE TEACHER WAGE RATES
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measuring quality is costly for government monitoring
agencies.
The estimates presented here have some limitations that
should be kept in mind. Only about 30% of preschool-age
children who are cared for by someone other than a parent
receive care in a center. It is important to learn more about
the supply of quality in other child care settings; the sample
of centers available for analysis is relatively small and is not
necessarily nationally representative. Thus, it would be
useful to replicate our results with other data and larger
samples. Finally, the interpretation of our results relies on
the assumption that firms seek to minimize cost. We could
not test this assumption because we lack data on the prices
of nonlabor inputs. Testing this assumption should be a
priority for future research on the supply of child care.
Despite these caveats, the results presented here appear to
be generally quite robust and potentially useful as a basis for
policy analysis.
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APPENDIX
The ECERS items are listed here. The ECERS items that are also part of the ITERS scale are indicated with an (*). Additional ITERS items are listed


































Health practice Active physical play
Health policy Peer interaction
Safety practice Adult-child interaction
Safety policy Discipline
Books and pictures Schedule of daily activities
Eye-hand coordination











Few materials present and





Some materials present, but




for free choice and
supervised use. At least
one planned activity
daily.
Everything in 5 plus teacher
provides good language









for free choice but major
emphasis on projects that




with art materials. Few
projects that are like an
example shown.
Variety of materials
available for free choice.
Attempt to relate art
activities to other
experiences.
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